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Z P / U H V R

(Zakordonne Predstavniytstvo Ukrainskoy Holovnoy Vyzvolnoy
Rady Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Council
of Liberation)

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unknown; possibly (G - J) in 1949 X
or 1950)

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PREFACE

The ZPUHVR (Foreign Representation of UHVR) is a small group of persons in Germany designated to represent the interests of the UHVR abroad. The group consists of a small nucleus of four members who reached the US zone of Germany from the Ukraine in 1945 and of a number of other members coopted by the original four. The official relationship of this body with the principal, organized center of resistance in the Ukraine, the UHVR, and evidence that it is probably the only group in Germany with a history of successful contacts across intervening territory in recent years are grounds for considering it the most promising operational group available.

It should be borne in mind throughout that ZPUHVR was composed initially of OUN/B members of long standing who did not sever relations with BANDERA in Germany until 1948, and are still in complete sympathy with the basic ideas of OUN proper because they consider themselves members of that party in the Ukraine.

Sources for this study include members of ZPUHVR and a number of published works bearing on the subject. Other sources have been sufficiently numerous and disparate in character to provide adequate confirmation for most of the statements made herein. However, as appears in the text, a number of questions of importance affecting the exact relationships, internal security and capabilities of the ZPUHVR remain unanswered, and some of the available information from the ZPUHVR itself is as yet unconfirmed by independent sources.

ZPUHVR

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ZPUHVR

I. Formation of UHVR

The OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - Organizatsiya Ukrainiskikh Natsionalistiv) was particularly active in organizing an underground movement in the Ukraine during WW II. Their efforts extended to the support and unification of the partisan bands but as a single political faction the OUN was unable to gain complete and unrestricted authority. Effective action for independence demanded a total unification of effort in the Ukraine and a strong centralized authority to direct it. By 1944 the situation in the Ukraine favored the creation of such an authority. (1) The partisan units were consolidating and taking on the form of a regular army. (2) German atrocities were forcing the Ukrainian people to take action. (3) The German armies were weakened and retreating before the Soviets. (4) The return of Soviet rule appeared imminent and the Ukrainian people were afraid of Soviet reprisals for their traitorous action during the war. (5) Ukrainian leaders saw that their chances of realizing an independent Ukraine after the Soviets had firmly reestablished themselves were practically non-existent. With the force of public opinion behind them, a favorable political situation, and the basis for a national army, the OUN pressed the other Ukrainian political factions for unification in July 1944 and the result was the formation of the UHVR Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada). The various Ukrainian political factions entered into the Council; disregarding their personal aspirations and agreeing on a basic political policy until such time as the independence of the Ukraine was achieved. This Council remains until the present the secret, underground government of the Ukraine.

II. Aims of UHVR

The basic aim of the UHVR was to establish unity in order to carry on the struggle for an independent Ukraine. The political platform embraced by them was the following:


1. Assurance of democratic government.
2. Freedom of thought, philosophy of life and religion.
3. Development of a Ukrainian National culture.
4. A just social order without the exploitation of any class.
5. Equality of justice before the law to all.
6. Full rights to minorities.
7. Equality of opportunity for all.
8. Independent and competitive economic system, with government interference only when necessary for the good of the nation.
9. Equitable distribution of the land, etc.

10. Nationalization of heavy industry and transport, cooperatives for light industry and food production, and freedom to choose between cooperative or private operation for small industry.
11. Free trade.
12. Free education.
13. Freedom for all classes.

The system of government advocated by UHVR is basically socialism (although points eight and eleven above appear to be in contradiction). This fact is brought out clearly in the economic policy specifically outlined in points nine and ten above. It is interesting to note that this statement of platform is designed to appeal to all political and racial elements in the Ukraine. Minorities are to receive full rights and communists would not find too drastic a change in the economic system and are assured that they would not be discriminated against. Points eight and eleven would placate the democratic factions, if not interpreted in the light of points nine and ten.

III. Structure of UHVR

The following diagram illustrates the structure of the UHVR:



The "Great Congress" is a general convention of delegates elected by the people. The "Great Congress" convenes and remains in session only long enough to elect the various government officers and act on special business and then is dissolved. The legislative powers then fall to the president and presidium. The Secretary-General corresponds roughly to the President in the United States Government and the various secretaries in the General-Secretariat correspond to the U.S. presidential cabinet. The General Court of the UHVR, appears to have less power than the U.S. Judiciary Branch but roughly corresponds to it. The Controller General's office audits the books, and issues financial statements of the UHVR departments and agencies. (For a complete and detailed description of organization, functions and responsibilities of each branch of UHVR see annex A)

Although the structure of this government appears to be very democratic it is in some respects patterned on the Soviet system which allows one party rule. It is clear that which ever political party has the greatest number of representatives in the "Great Congress" can fill all of the government offices with its own men. Since the Congress does not remain in session for long, the UHVR officials are free to act along party lines from the moment they get into office and have absolutely no opposition. From all indications the OUN in the Ukraine is by far the strongest political party and has had the largest representation at the "Great Congress". This is reflected by the fact that all UHVR members known to this office are OUN members. (For list of members of UHVR see Annex B)

IV. Formation, Mission and Dispatch of ZP/UHVR

The ZPUHVR, Foreign Representation of the UHVR (Zakardonne Predstavniytstvo UHVR) was formed in 1944. The reason for creating this unit is not clear and a number of possibilities present themselves: (1) Bandera, who was in Germany, failed to establish contact with the Ukraine, (2) Bandera was unsuccessful in obtaining aid or recognition for the UHVR, (3) The leaders of the OUN in the Ukraine wanted to shake loose of Bandera's leadership, (4) Elements other than OUN in the UHVR insisted on supra-party representation abroad, (5) leaders of the OUN in the Ukraine did not believe that Bandera could unite the Ukrainian colony abroad, (6) leaders in the Ukraine doubted Bandera's acceptability to the Western powers since he collaborated with the Germans, (7) personal conflicts between Bandera and members of the OUN in the Ukraine, etc. Whatever the reasons for disregarding Bandera and his organization abroad, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the UHVR, Mikola LEBED, together with Rev. Dr. Ivan HRINIOCH, Vasil OKRENOVICH, and Mrs. Daria REBET, departed the Ukraine in 1945 and came to the United States Zone

of Germany. Their mission apparently was to act as ambassadors of the UHVR to foreign governments and to establish contact with some Ukrainian organization which would serve as the external organ of the UHVR. (It appears that the Ukrainians sought to establish a situation somewhat comparable to that of the Poles during war time. The Poles had an underground government in Warsaw which was the supreme authority and an exile government in London which conducted all foreign affairs and solicited the assistance of the Polish colony abroad.)

V. Political Situation Confronting ZP/UHVR in Germany

When the Foreign Representatives arrived in Germany they contacted both the OUN/B and UNR, Ukrainian National Council (Ukrainska Natsionalna Rada). Both Alexander SHULGIN and Pavel SHANDRUK were at the time influential members of the latter body, and stood ready to recognize the inferior position of the UNR to the UHVR. However, LEVITSKY and his other followers were not of the same mind and held to the theory that they represented the legal government of the Ukraine and based their authority on that of the Petlura State. When the Conference of Ambassadors was about to convene in Paris in 1946, it was considered politically expedient to place the problems of the Ukraine before the delegates. Representatives of the ZPUHVR (PROKOP) together with SHULGIN and SHANDRUK drafted a note to present to the conference which indicated that complete unity existed among the leading factions in Ukrainian political life. This document apparently pointed out that the UHVR was the supreme Ukrainian governmental authority because LEVITSKY was quick to repudiate the note and the effort failed. Both Alexander SHULGIN and Paul SHANDRUK resigned from the UNR in protest.

Up to 1948, Dr. HRINIOCH tried to work out some arrangement with UNR but always insisted upon the fact that UNR must recognize the UHVR as the supreme authority. UNR has refused flatly and ZPUHVR broke off all official negotiations. (Vasyl MJDRY, one of the leaders of the UNR, enters into the early structure of the ZPUHVR and undoubtedly served as a source of information on UNR activity).

VI. ZP/UHVR Approaches to OUN/B

In addition to the negotiations that the members of ZPUHVR conducted with UNR, they also made immediate contact with OUN/B. Most of the members of ZPUHVR held important posts in Bandera's organization until 1948. At that time Bandera insisted that the members of ZPUHVR resign their mandates from ZPUHVR and when they refused Bandera expelled them from his organization.

It is likely that the Foreign Representatives had considered the use of OUN/B as the external organ of the UHVR. There are number of possibilities which would explain why the ZPUHVR did not grant official recognition to the OUN/B: (1) they might have had instructions from the UHVR not to do so, (2) they might have considered the fact that OUN/B was inappropriate to represent all Ukrainian factions and could not gain the support of the entire Ukrainian emigration, (3) there may have been a conflict of personal ambitions between Bandera and the leaders of ZPUHVR, (4) differences in matters of policy between the two groups, or (5) personal conflicts. It is likely that the real reason for non-recognition of OUN/B was a combination of several of the aforementioned possibilities.

It is interesting to note that while members of ZPUHVR were leading members of OUN/B in Germany, Bandera joined the KUK, Ukrainian Coordinating Committee (Koordinatsionny Ukrainsky Komitet). The KUK was an effort to unite Ukrainian political factions in Germany but lasted for only a short time. It was organized on somewhat democratic lines and when OUN/B was unable to gain absolute control of the organization they withdrew. The withdrawal of OUN/B caused the organization to collapse, which indicates that it had the largest representation and perhaps even sponsored the movement. (There are indications that Dr. O. KUSHNIR, representing the United American Ukrainian Relief Committee, and believed to be in OUN, promoted idea of KUK). The entrance into or formation of the KUK may have been an attempt on the part of OUN/B to meet the requirements of the ZPUHVR.

When UNR was reorganized, OUN/B sent six delegates to the Council but made clear that it did not offer its whole-hearted support to the movement and refused to allow its delegates to enter the Executive Council. The entrance of OUN/B into UNR would indicate that they sought to insure their position in the eventuality that UNR gained some formal recognition; further that all official ties between them and ZPUHVR were completely severed.

(Because of the inter-relation of both party and government in UHVR, it is likely that both Bandera and the leaders of the ZPUHVR are at the moment striving to get some positive statement and definition of authority from their leaders in the Ukraine. It is probable that whichever organization first succeeds in establishing contact with the Ukraine and presents a convincing case will receive a superior position. The simple fact of establishing liaison channels to the Ukraine might in itself be a convincing argument for favoring one organization over the other).

VII. Reorganization of ZPUHVR in Germany

Since the ZPUHVR was unable to come to any satisfactory agreement with the UNR or the OUN/B, they set themselves up as an organization on lines similar to the UHVR. It is not clear just when the organization took place but with most probability shortly after the arrival of the Foreign Representatives in the US Zone of Germany. They undoubtedly surveyed the Ukrainian political scene hurriedly and after examining the difficulties and lack of facilities decided to form their own organization, with themselves as the nucleus. The following list indicates the structure and personalities in the ZPUHVR in October 1948:

President: Eugene VRECHIONA @ Josef BARAN (Basel, Switzerland).

First Vice-President: Rev. Dr. Ivan HRINIOCH (member UHVR) (Munich, Germany)

Second Vice-President: Prof. Fedor VOLCHUK (VOVCHUK?) (member OUN/B) (Germany)

Foreign Section: Mikola LEBED (member UHVR) (Munich, Germany)

Military Section: Rev. Dr. Ivan HRINIOCH (see above)

Internal Section: Rev. Dr. Ivan HRINIOCH (see above)

Finance Section: MARTIUK (Germany)

Organization Section: Vasil OKREMOVICH (member UHVR) (Germany)

Political Intelligence: Vasil OKREMOVICH (see above)

Col. Ivan BORKOVSKY @ HUTSUL (Germany)

UPA Representatives: Col. Yuri LOPATINSKY @ KALINA (Munich, Germany)

Maj. BAIDA (Germany)

Other Members: Mrs. Daris REBET @ Daria ORLAND (Munich, Germany (member UHVR)

Lev REBET (Munich, Germany)

Prof. Leo SHANKOVSKY (member UHVR and OUN/B) (Germany)

Vasil MUDRY (member UNR, UNDO, UHVR, CPUE) (Germany)

Zenon PELENSKY (Germany)

Yaroslav STETSKO (member OUN/B & chief of ABN) (Germany)

Volodimir PROKOP @ Vladimir LUHOVY (member UHVR) (Germany)

Dr. TURULA (member UHVR) (Germany)

Prof. TCHUIKO (Germany)

Vasil POTISHKO (Germany)

Vladimir STACHIV (Munich, Germany)

Bogdan OKOLOT (Stockholm, Sweden)

Representatives and

Contact Personnel: Pavlo SHUMOVSKY, Paris, France

Bohdan CHAIKOVSKY, Innsbruck, Austria

Volodimir LOBAY, Canada

Eugen VRECHIONA, Basel, Switzerland

It must be emphasized that the foregoing structure has been somewhat modified since 1948. According to recent reports Ivan HRINIOCH is the real leader of the ZPUHVR, Mikola LEBED and Volodimir PROKOP have emigrated from

Germany to the United States, Yaroslav STETSKO has been dropped, members listed as belonging to OUN/B have resigned from that organization and now consider themselves members of the OUN in the Ukraine, Yuri LOPATINSKY is chief of the Military Section and in direct charge of security and operations, Major BAIDA is LOPATINSKY's assistant and in direct charge of debriefing recent arrivals from the Ukraine, Engr. Vasyl POTISHKO @ POLONOSKI is in charge of Financial, Legal and Administrative affairs, and Vasyl MUDRY takes no active part in the ZPUHVR activities and is believed to have emigrated to the U.S.

VIII. Finances of ZPUHVR

According to one report all of the members of ZPUHVR, with the exception of Mikola LEBED, are financially independent. LEBED is presently trying to start an Ukrainian news syndicate in the U.S. Ivan HRINIOCH is apparently supported by the Catholic Church; Daria REBET teaches law at the Ukrainian University in Munich, Germany; Ivan VOVCHUK is head of the CPUE, Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration (Tsentralne Predstavnitstvo Ukrainsky Emigratsky), which is an important welfare organization in Germany and supplies financial and material help to new arrivals from the Ukraine. (It is believed that the CPUE probably gives preferential treatment to individuals recommended by ZPUHVR). In addition to the support received from the CPUE, the ZPUHVR has recently republished a copy of an underground magazine of the UHVR (Samostynist) and since the latter part of 1948 has published the Ukrainian Tribune in Germany. These sources of revenue are probably adequate to cover the average expenses of the ZPUHVR. There has been no estimate submitted to indicate the approximate budget of the ZPUHVR or how much money they expend for Intelligence purposes. Expenditures for Intelligence purposes are probably very small because most Ukrainians work from a patriotic motive and a majority of them have DP status which entitles them to I RO care.

IX. ZPUHVR Relations With:

A. OUN/Bandera

ZPUHVR-OUN/B collaboration was very close until the fall of 1948. Many of the leaders of ZPUHVR held high positions on the directing committee of OUN/B and one of the men, STACHIV, was editor of the Ukrainian Tribune, which was the Bandera party organ. (Ukrainian Tribune is now reported to be the organ of ZPUHVR). There was a continual friction between Bandera and the leaders of ZPUHVR, based primarily on jealousy and personal ambitions, which probably limited the amount of information ZPUHVR revealed concerning their organization and activities. The members of ZPUHVR also differed with Bandera on questions of policy. ZPUHVR favored a lenient attitude toward all Ukrainian organizations in order to

unite them under one head and consolidate their efforts. They also favored close cooperation with the Americans or British, in return for some immediate aid and eventual support in case of war. Bandera on the other hand, having been "burned" through his cooperation with the Germans, adhered strictly to basic UHVR policy, which stated, in effect, that experience of collaborating with the Germans, Soviets and Poles had only led to the exploitation of the Ukraine and therefore the UHVR would not entertain any assistance from a foreign nation but would conduct its own struggle for independence. (This UHVR policy was probably only intended to apply to neighboring European powers which had a definite interest in acquiring the Ukraine). Bandera interpreted this policy to mean a superficial collaboration with the Western Powers was permissible, and then only with a written guarantee of assistance for the cause of Ukrainian Independence, adequate supply of financial and material help and the disclosure of no information concerning the organization or methods of the resistance movement. (Since 1948 Bandera has modified his opinion and has sought collaboration with the Americans). He further more favored maintaining a tight knit organization with strict discipline and the exclusion of insecure organizations or elements. (Bandera's concept of party organization is somewhat comparable to that of the Bolsheviks while ZPUHVR holds the organizational ideas of the Mensheviks).

Bandera finally forced the issue between ZPUHVR leaders and his organization by calling a meeting in Mittenwald, Germany, on August 29-31, 1948, which was attended almost exclusively by his own supporters. Bandera introduced a motion to dissolve ZPUHVR and the motion was carried. Consequently, letters were sent to all the ZPUHVR members in September 1948, asking them to resign their mandates from UHVR. The ZPUHVR disregarded the letters and in October-November the SB of OUN/B carried out a purge to officially expel them. Since that time there has been a definite break between the two organizations. However, information dealing with Ukrainian resistance in the homeland is still exchanged. Mikola LEBED is a personal friend of Yaroslav STETSKO, who is deputy commander of OUN/B and chief of ABN, Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations (Anti-Bolshevitskaya Blok Natsiyi), and maintains contact with him on matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Ukraine. Since LEBED has left Germany it is likely that this contact is maintained by other members of OUN/B and ZPUHVR.

B. UN Rada

ZPUHVR-UNR relations deteriorated rapidly as a result of the refusal of UNR to recognize the UHVR as the supreme authority

in Ukrainian political life. The parties of the center within UNR, and such outstanding Ukrainian leaders as Paul SHANDRUK, Alexander SHULGIN and Vasyl MUDRY, favored the establishment of a relationship somewhat comparable to the war time relationship between the London Polish Government and the Underground Government in Warsaw. Accordingly, they wanted the UNR to act as the legal exile government and the UHVR was to be the supreme authority in the Ukraine and rightful heir to power when the independence of the homeland was realized. UNR was not reorganized until 1948, and in the summer of 1946, Alexander SHULGIN and Pavel SHANDRUK together with members of ZPUHVR drafted a note for the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers stating the position of the anti-Soviet Ukrainians and signed the note in the name of both UNR and UHVR (as the united leadership of the Ukrainians). Andrey LEVITSKY, president of the UNR, repudiated the note in the name of UNR and SHULGIN and SHANDRUK resigned from his organization in protest. (The contents of the note are not known and therefore it is impossible to state whether LEVITSKY objected to the contents of the note or simply to the implication that his government was subordinate to UHVR). After the incident of the note to the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris in 1946, ZPUHVR still continued to try to work out some arrangement with UNR, particularly through Vasyl MUDRY. ZPUHVR went as far as to concede the absolute authority of the UNR abroad but stubbornly insisted that UHVR was to be the supreme authority in the Ukraine. Andrey LEVITSKY and his exile government maintained their claim to absolute authority on the grounds that they received their power from the Petlura government (1918-1921) which was the only legally created and popularly supported government of the homeland. UHVR is ready to recognize their authority abroad only and holds that it alone represents the will of the people in the Ukraine at present and de facto is their secret government.

It is unlikely that the UNR will in the near future consider subordinating itself to the UHVR but rather will make a concentrated effort to gain the universal support of the Ukrainian emigration. It has endeavored to do this by negotiating with the Polish "Shadow government" in London, which has given it de juri recognition as the Ukrainian government; reorganization which has allowed liberal representation for all Ukrainian political groups; created an executive council which places the actual governing power in the hands of a number of political parties; supports an international organization (Oceanic Institute of the Atlantic Charter) which envisions an independent Ukraine governing most of European Russia with a population of three hundred million (an idea which might appeal to many unrealistic and fanatic Ukrainians); and finally seeks wide publicity in the Ukrainian emigrant press.

C. Hetman Group

There are conflicting reports concerning the relations of ZPUHVR to the Hetman Group. With the exception of one report there has been absolutely no indication that the Hetman organization supports the UNR. All other reports indicate that the Hetman Group has recognized the authority of the UHVR and offers moderate support to the ZPUHVR in Germany. Only one report states that Danilo SKOROPADSKY, son of the late Hetman of the organization, supports the UNR. Theoretically, SKOROPADSKY inherited the leadership of the organization from his father, but there are indications that he takes no active part in Ukrainian politics. This fact might explain how he as an individual may have lent his support to the UNR while the real leaders of the Hetman organization have supported the ZPUHVR.

D. Veteran's Groups

There have been no reports indicating the relationship (if any) of the ZPUHVR to the Ukrainian veterans groups, particularly the Combatants or TUVO, Association of Ukrainian Veterans (Tovaristvo Ukrainskikh Veteranuv). One report which appears to be somewhat confused, lists the various headquarters of the Ukrainian Veterans organizations and states that they enter into the structure of the UHVR, but closes by describing a visit to the headquarters of the chief of the Military Section of UHVR, KAPUSTIANSKY. General KAPUSTIANSKY, is and has been the Secretary of War of the UNP, and it is therefore assumed that the reference to UHVR in the report was in error. However, it is logical to assume that there is a rather large faction of former military personnel who give their allegiance to the UPA or UHVR and consequently would recognize the ZPUHVR as the proper Ukrainian representation abroad. There has been no report stating that any Ukrainian veterans organization has been formed in Germany which recognizes the authority of the ZPUHVR. It is assumed that if such an organization does not exist, the Military Section of the ZPUHVR maintains some sort of liaison with individual UPA members within the TUVO.

E. Ukrainian Organizations in U.S.

ZPUHVR contact with organizations in the United States has been almost exclusively on the basis of acquaintances built up through membership in OUN/B. Prior to and during WW II ZPUHVR did not exist and its present leaders were members of the OUN. Consequently, both PROKOP and LEBED are probably in contact with the ODMU Organization for the Rebirth of the Ukraine (Organizatsiya Derzhavnovo Vyrozhdzenia Ukrainy) which was the counterpart of the

OUN in the United States prior to WW II. ODWU was reported dissolved during the early part of WW II, but since the war has been revived by a faction favoring the leadership of Andrey MELNIK.

PROKOP is known to be in contact with the (D) FFU - Defense of the Four Freedoms for the Ukraine, which is an off-shoot of the prewar ODWU, favoring the leadership of BANDERA.

Since LEBED is a rather renowned figure in Ukrainian circles and a journalist of some merit, he has undoubtedly established contact with the editorial staff of SVOBODA, a Ukrainian newspaper published in Jersey City which represents the Ukrainian National Association (one of the oldest and largest Ukrainian organizations in the United States). The knowledge which LEBED evidenced of Ukrainian organizations in the United States would indicate that he or PROKOP have a broad acquaintance with all of the major organizations and their leaders.

The strongest contact appears to be with the (D) FFU, since PROKOP received some publicity as a speaker at one of their banquets. Another tie is indicated with the Ukrainian Congress Committee, a high level organizational group in the United States, since LEBED was present at one of their rare conventions very shortly after his arrival in this country.

F. Ukrainian Organizations in Switzerland

Eugene WRECIANA (VREDHYONA) is known to be the ZPUHVR representative in Switzerland. His permanent residence is in BASEL. His organizational contacts in that country are not known. Since he maintains contact with the son of Alexander SHULGIN, ROSTISLAV, it may be assumed that he deals primarily with the "old emigre" clique.

G. Ukrainian Organizations in France and Belgium

Pavlo SHUMOVSKY is listed as the ZPUHVR contact in Paris. It is possible that he, like many of the other leaders of the ZPUHVR, is an OUN member and utilizes the facilities of that organization in Paris. The cover of the OUN/B in Paris has been given as "Syndicate of Christian Ukrainian Workers of France". This organization publishes a newspaper, Ukrainians in France, Meutholon St. 26, Paris, edited by POPOWICZ, whose editorial offices serve as the actual headquarters for OUN/B in Paris. The name Roman CZAJKOWSKI has also been linked with the Ukrainian editorial office in Paris.

The Hetman representative in Paris is a catholic priest and because of the close relations of this organization with ZPUHVR, and the fact that HRINIOCH is also a Catholic priest, it is not unlikely that he also utilizes this contact. The French branch of the Hetman movement is headed by Rev. J. Th. PERRIDON, who resides at 186 Blvd. St. Germaine, Paris.

For the reason given above it is possible that the Belgian contact of the Hetman Organization, Rev. Ildefonse DIRKS, (Greek Catholic Cloister) Amay-sur-Meuse, is also used by the ZPUHVR. It is also possible that Eugene STACHIV @ Pavliuk KRAUS, 30 year old OUN/B liaison agent is now the ZPUHVR contact since he and his brother, Vladimir were expelled from OUN/B.

Somewhat dubious information lists the Ukrainian Aid Committee (Ukrainsky Dopomogovy Komitet) in Brussels, Belgium, as the headquarters of the ZPUHVR in that country. However, the rest of the same report indicates that it is rather the headquarters of the OUN/B. The possibility that ZPUHVR may have a representative in this committee cannot be discounted. The president of the Belgian Committee is MULKIEWICZ, who lives in MALINNES, and the Secretary is Yaroslav PRYSZLAK.

H. Vatican

Contact with the Vatican is maintained through Bishop BUCZKO (BUCHKO), a former member of OUN and close friend of Ivan HRINIOCH and Mikola LEBED. BUCZKO is a member of the Oriental Institute of the Vatican and an expert on Ukrainian affairs. He is very well known in Ukrainian circles all over the world, has travelled extensively in North and South America and is the author of numerous articles on the Ukraine. He has taken a continued and active interest in Ukrainian politics and the welfare problems of the refugees. His overt interest in the Ukrainians has always been with welfare problems but his wide acquaintance among political leaders and knowledge of political problems would indicate that he maintains a close liaison and takes extreme interest in Ukrainian political movements.

I. Ukrainian Groups in England

No official contacts of the ZPUHVR with England have been given but it is probable that some liaison is maintained through Yaroslav STETSKO, who is reported to be residing there now. STETSKO is the president of ABN, Anti-Bolshevik Block of Nations, to which ZPUHVR subscribes. He is also deputy commander of the OUN/B in Germany and LEBED has admitted a continued liaison with

him despite the fact that ZPUHVR was expelled from that organization. Other sources of information for ZPUHVR in England may be the Ukrainian veterans organization or the representative of Hetman group. None of the aforementioned possibilities have been confirmed.

X. ZP/UHVR Intelligence Operations

A. Intelligence Contacts with U.S.

Original contact was established with CIA in the following manner: Rev. Ivo ZEIGER, special advisor to the Chief of the Vatican mission to USFET at Kronberg, introduced our agent to Rev. DIACZISYN, who had formerly been on the same mission but at the time was in Rome. Father DIACZISYN introduced our agent to Bishop BUCZKO, Vatican advisor on Ukrainian affairs, who referred him to Vasyl MUDRY in Germany. After a number of discussions with MUDRY he referred our agent to Ivan HRINIOCH and Yury LOPATINSKY. In turn LEBED and other leaders of ZPUHVR were introduced to CIA agents in Munich. Operations with ZPUHVR have resulted in one "drop" operation into the Soviet Ukraine and a considerable amount of information on Ukrainian anti-Soviet activities in Germany and the Ukraine has been furnished. Information on the Ukraine has come from couriers dispatched by UPA-UHVR; from the debriefing of UPA soldiers who escaped to the US Zone of Germany; and other escapees or refugees. Information supplied by ZPUHVR, although dated, has served as a basis for our knowledge of the anti-Soviet resistance movement in the Ukraine. A rather close cooperation with the ZPUHVR on intelligence problems has been achieved.

B. Intelligence Contacts with the Vatican

Although ZPUHVR denies any intelligence contacts with the Vatican and insists that all liaison is purely political, there has been no confirmation of this fact. The possibility that Ivan HRINIOCH supplies intelligence information to Bishop BUCZKO exists.

C. Intelligence Contacts with the British

An early report on ZPUHVR indicates that contact with the British was established in the British Zone of Germany in 1946. However, HRINIOCH denies the existence of this contact in 1948. No information, other than the statements of ZPUHVR, has ever been received concerning this contact nor has the identity of the ZPUHVR contact in the British Zone ever been revealed.

D. Intelligence Contacts with the Hungarians

ZPUHVR stated that in 1944, at the request of the Hungarian General Staff, HRINIOCH and some of his followers, went to Budapest where they concluded a pact which stated in effect that Ukrainian partisans and Hungarian troops would not fight each other. There were indications that ZPUHVR established contact with some Hungarian anti-Soviet organization in Germany but HRINIOCH stated that all relations with the Hungarians, Rumanians and the Polish Holy Cross Brigade were broken by the summer of 1948. Just what these contacts consisted of and degree of collaboration is not known. Primary source of information that such contacts existed came from ZPUHVR.

E. Intelligence Contacts in Switzerland

Rostislav SHULGIN residing in Switzerland has maintained close contact with Eugene VRECHIONA in BASEL, Switzerland and also with other leaders of the ZPUHVR in Germany. SHULGIN was employed by the Swiss Mission until March 1948. He was dropped because he failed to provide specific intelligence information but rather furnished political reports on the Ukrainian emigration, their organizations, and leaders. In a report dated February 1948, he revealed his acquaintance with a London-Polish intelligence officer, M. CHOYNACKI, and a British intelligence officer. CHOYNACKI was introduced to STACHIV and LOPATINSKI in Munich in Feb. 1948, and the possibility of joint Ukrainian-Polish anti-Soviet intelligence operations were discussed. There is a possibility that CHOYNACKI might have started to work for the French. Consequently there is a possibility that SHULGIN, who is a journalist by profession and entirely dependent on his wages, may have sought to increase his income by selling his services to some other government after being dropped by the Americans, and possibly to CHOYNACKI. He is believed to still be a confidant of Vrechiona and ZPUHVR.

XI. ZPUHVR Intelligence Sources

A. Informant Network in DP Camps

There have been implications that the military Section of the ZPUHVR under LOPATINSKY maintains a widespread informant network in the DP Camps in Germany. The extent of the network or degree of coverage they afford ZPUHVR has not been disclosed. The details of this network are very important since ZPUHVR is dependent on it for gaining knowledge of new arrivals from the Ukraine, who furnish a large part of the information ZPUHVR gains about the homeland. Whether the new arrival is a courier from

UHVR, UPA, or OUN, or just an escapee, his presence is made known to ZPUHVR. (If the informant network is inadequate in some areas it would be well to know this in order to instruct ZPUHVR to recruit more personnel in that area or another means of coverage might be provided). The organization that ZPUHVR uses has been generally satisfactory but there have been indications that it has permitted some arrivals with valuable information to slip through, and has not contacted others until some time after they have been in the US Zone. Although an extremely elaborate informant network in the DP Camps would present many technical difficulties and would be unnecessary, some knowledge of the net is necessary in order to know its capabilities and limitations so that adjustment can be made for its inadequacies.

Some information about the personnel who make up the net is necessary for security reasons. The net must receive some instruction and frequently has knowledge and access to persons with valuable and secret information coming from the Ukraine. Consequently, the presence of a Soviet informant in the net could completely compromise information coming from the Ukraine and render the couriers useless for redispach.

B. Informant Nets or Penetration of Other Ukrainian Groups

ZPUHVR appears to have excellent high level penetration of other Ukrainian organizations which provides information on Ukrainian politics and activities. Providing that the flow of information is just from the other organizations to ZPUHVR, there is no security problem. However, there are indications that information is to some extent exchanged. The exchange of information dealing with Ukrainian politics has been to some extent confirmed (relations of ZPUHVR to UNR (Mudry), CPUE, etc). There has been no indication of an exchange of intelligence information, although LEBED himself stated that he discussed information arriving from the Ukraine with STETSKO and consequently OUN/B. ZPUHVR was aware of the courier route of OUN/B to France. It is logical to assume that since ZPUHVR members were also leaders of OUN/B until the fall of 1948, they were familiar with all of the intelligence activities of OUN/B, and when they broke-off relations might have gained control of some of these facilities.

Except for some of the contacts of a few of the top leaders of ZPUHVR, nothing is known about how, through whom and on what basis information is secured concerning other Ukrainian organizations and their activities. It would appear logical that some sort of agreement between the various organizations would exist so that they could keep themselves mutually informed.

Intelligence gathered by one group would naturally be of interest to some of the others. Therefore, either a penetration operation or an agreement of some sort must exist among them.

C. Representatives or Contacts Abroad

Representatives or members of the ZPUHVR abroad are in touch with various Ukrainian organizations and undoubtedly have access to any information of an intelligence nature which these organizations possess. Just what intelligence information, if any, is supplied to ZPUHVR from their representatives abroad is not known. LEBED'S contacts in the United States have been with Ukrainian organizations which are either welfare agencies or Ukrainian political organizations which may or may not have any intelligence gathering apparatus.

It is possible that ZPUHVR uses the facilities of OUN/B and the World Union of Hetman Organizations, as well as the Ukrainian Veterans organization to gather information from abroad. Actually the foreign intelligence requirements of the ZPUHVR are very small, consisting chiefly in basic political information, and that particularly about the Ukrainian emigrant groups.

D. Debriefing of Recent Arrivals

ZPUHVR's only source of information concerning the Ukraine has been from couriers sent out by OUN, UHVR or UPA, and from the debriefing of escapees. Courier contact has been mostly a hit-or-miss proposition. Approximately one group of couriers per year has been sent out by the UHVR since 1947. There has been no report dealing with the dispatch of couriers from Germany to the Ukraine by the ZPUHVR. There is some indication that couriers were dispatched to the Ukraine prior to 1947, but it is not clear if these were specifically ZPUHVR couriers or whether ZPUHVR was simply making use of OUN/B facilities.

XII. ZPUHVR Security and Operational Methods

There has been considerable mention of the security consciousness of the leaders of the ZPUHVR as individuals but no report indicating how they maintain their own security or that of their organization. According to various reports, security falls into the purview of the Military Section which is headed by LOPATINSKY, but just how he deals with it is not brought out.

Major BAIDA is directly in charge of debriefing new arrivals from the Ukraine and is subordinate to LOPATINSKY in the Military Section of

ZPUHVR. There has been no information on the methods of debriefing that are used. It may be assumed that he must use some form of identification to win the confidence of the new arrivals because of the extreme security consciousness of most Soviet citizens. Whether a code identification or simply discussing events and personalities is used has not been made clear.

What sort of a brief, if any, is used by BAIDA is not known. It is likely that many elements of information which the border crossers could be questioned about are neglected. There have been no names or address of individuals along the route who helped them in their escape submitted by ZPUHVR, nor have current details on life in the Ukraine, such as postal communications, etc. been forthcoming. If BAIDA does question recent arrivals in detail on all these points, it is obvious that ZPUHVR is "holding out" information either for their own use or to secure their position with the Americans.

XIII. ZPUHVR Communications

A. Courier Routes

There is no information on the overland courier routes to the Ukraine which were used by ZPUHVR, is there ever were any. (As mentioned before, it is possible that prior to 1948, ZPUHVR may have used the facilities of OUN/B). Couriers arriving from the Ukraine have followed various routes across Czechoslovakia to the U.S. Zone of Germany or Austria. There has been no indication that they follow a prearranged route nor that they have contacts or safe houses to use during their trip. To date small, armed UPA Combat groups have been dispatched as couriers with instructions to travel cross-country and fight if necessary.

OUN/B maintains an illegal courier route to Paris. The courier travels from Munich to Karlsruhe by train and from there to Burg by taxi. The border is crossed at night from Burg to Lam(?)terbourg, France and then the courier proceeds by train to Strassbourg and then to Paris. ZPUHVR was familiar with this route but withheld information of it. This may be explained by the fact that they had used it for their own purposes prior to the fall of 1948.

B. Letter Drops

The following are letter drops used by UHVR and ZPUHVR:

Esteban (Stefan) HORYNEC
c. Mozart 614
Buenos Aires

George DZURA
Montrial, Canada (complete address not given)

Michael HOLOVATI
Marquette, Michigan (complete address not given)

No other letter drops have been revealed by ZPUHVR but OUN/B has at least one in Poland which they use in contacting ZENON, the UPA leader in southern Poland. It is probable that ZPUHVR has knowledge of the letter drops used by OUN/B and may make use of them.

The existence of letter drops used by UHVR outside of the Ukraine indicates that some postal communication is possible. The degree to which ordinary postal channels have been used in communicating with the Ukraine or getting information from the Ukraine has not been revealed but LEBED has admitted that both ZPUHVR and UHVR have many at their disposal. A study of Soviet postal controls indicates that communication between villages just across the border from each other by mail is fairly easy. Consequently, it is not improbable that a chain for postal communications from the Ukraine to Poland or Slovakia and then to some point outside of Europe has been established by UHVR. However, there has been no confirmation of the fact that postal channels are used with the exception of the information on the letter drops listed above, and the indication that there are many others.

C. Secret Inks

The question of the use of secret inks comes up in conjunction with the use of postal communication. With the exception of the drop operation there has been no indication of whether or not ZPUHVR employs secret inks in communicating with the Ukraine. If they do, exact details concerning this practice and formula of ink and developer should be obtained so that the security of such communications may be judged. The use of some antiquated formula would show the facility with which the Soviets could detect it.

D. Wireless Communication

Besides the radios carried into the Ukraine on the air drop operation (which have never been used) there has been mention in a number of reports that the underground in the Ukraine operates radios. The most detailed of these reports, which is of somewhat doubtful reliability, states that there are two hundred kilowatt transmitters hidden in the Ukraine and were secure as of January 1949. The report stated also that in 1944, the broadcasts were made in several languages and continued until September 1946. At that

time transmissions had to be stopped for lack of spare parts and the radios were securely hidden. At the time of the broadcasts the station identification was given as "Samostina Ukrayina", which would indicate that it was controlled by UHVR. (LEBED indicates in his book that the operation of radio transmitters in the UKraine had been a function of the TS, Technical SService, which was affiliated with OUN).

There has been no confirmed report of radio transmissions from the Ukrainian resistance movements. Reported instances of transmission have always failed to give sufficient detail concerning time of transmission or frequency which would make interception possible.

E. Codes

There have been no indications that the resistance organizations in the Ukraine use codes but it seems logical that they do, particularly in courier transmissions and in letters sent through normal postal channels to letter drops within and outside of the Ukraine. There has been positive indication that codes or passwords for the purpose of identification among members are used. Apparently the identification code is prescribed by higher headquarters for each specific contact a member must make with another member. Organization of OUN in the Ukraine is based on the cell system to some extent which supposes that members with the exception of the cell leader of one cell do not know any members outside of their cell. The cell leaders or chiefs of administrative districts agree upon an identification code and pass it on to the members of their respective groups who are to communicate with each other. It is likely that some standard form of identification also exists which is used in emergencies. It would be natural that this standard identification would be changed periodically.

F. Use of Communications Facilities of Other Organizations

Various organizations other than ZPUHVR and OUN/B have tried to establish contact with the Ukraine. Although little detail is available, it has been reported that Taras BULBA (BOROVETS) had attempted to establish contact with the Ukraine in behalf of the UNR. OUN/M and UNDO have also attempted to establish contact with the Ukraine. There has been no indication that the latter three organizations have been successful. Each of these organizations have at various times boasted that they had contact but there has been no evidence to substantiate it.

It appears probable that ZPUHVR would utilize the communication channels of any organization to establish contact with the Ukraine and consequently observes the efforts of other organizations very carefully. UNDO (headed by Vasil MUDRY) and OUN/B were well established in Poland and are the most likely Ukrainian organizations to reestablish contact in that country. Since a UPA detachment has been recently reported in southern Poland under the command of ZENON, communication to Poland takes on a new importance. Apparently OUN/B has established letter boxes in Poland for communicating with the Ukraine, but it is not known if ZPUHVR is familiar with them nor if they have, or could make use of them.

G. Czech or Polish Underground

There has been no indication to date that the ZPUHVR has tried to use the facilities of the Slovakian or Polish underground or intelligence channels in order to establish contact with the Ukraine. Because of the antagonism between the Poles and Ukrainians, and particularly that of OUN, it does not seem likely that they would ever enter into any close agreement unless absolutely forced to by circumstances. (As in the case of the UPA-Polish partisan pact of 1946). Although the UPA had excellent relations with the Slovakian peasantry there is no indication that there is any contact with the underground in that country.

It has been reported that the Ukrainian partisans, probably UPA-UHVR, maintained some liaison with the Lithuanian Resistance Movement. During the last half of WW II there was a regularly established courier route to Belorussia where representatives of both groups would meet. (The meetings took place in a marsh area south of Vilno). Whether liaison between the Lithuanians and Ukrainians continues is not known, but believed likely, since deported Lithuanians who escape from the interior of Russia usually pass through Ukrainian territory on their way back to their homes.

There has been no indication that the ZPUHVR has tried to utilize the communication facilities of the Lithuanian organizations in Germany to establish contact with the Ukraine. It seems likely, because of the relations between the two groups in the USSR, that the Foreign Representatives would have considered liaison for such a purpose. However, there are no details concerning their collaboration, if any exists.

XIV. Soviet Operations Against ZPUHVR

It may be assumed that the Soviets are interested in the whereabouts and activities of their former nationals because as they present a threat to the Soviet Union through their anti-Soviet activity or when utilized

by a foreign intelligence service and may be considered as an asset to the Soviet Union as potential intelligence agents. This is sufficient motivation to warrant an extensive operation on the part of the Soviet Union to keep track of their former citizens, utilizing them when possible and neutralizing them when they present a threat. It is a relatively simple matter for the Soviets to conduct intelligence operations into Germany, where most of the Anti-Soviet DP activities take place. Assuming that the Soviet Union did not want to bother with an extensive operation on the DP's in general, it must be assumed that they would at least concentrate on penetration of the major Anti-Soviet groupings and follow the activities of their leaders. ZPUHVR and its leaders are as notorious in the Soviet Union, as is Bandera and OUN/B. The notoriety of Bandera is obvious from the repeated attempts of Soviet officials in Germany and in the U.N. to get his extradition. Considering the excellent opportunities that the Soviets had for estimating the intelligence situation in Germany and gathering support material through their Repatriation Officer, it must be assumed that they have succeeded in thoroughly penetrating all Ukrainian groups.

A report dated August 14, 1947, submitted by a double agent of doubtful reliability, states that the MGB in Kiev has a thorough knowledge of the political situation among Ukrainian DP's in Germany. The Soviet officer brought out some of the difficulties between ZPUHVR and OUN/B which indicated this. He listed Dr. HRINIOCH, Mikola LEBED, the two STACHIV brothers and Lev and Daria REBET as dissatisfied with the Bandera organization. He stated at the time that there was a split between ZPUHVR and OUN/B. He listed STETSKO, among others, as remaining loyal to BANDERA. If this information actually came from a Soviet Officer it would indicate excellent intelligence coverage and a high level penetration of the important Ukrainian groupings in Germany.

The Soviet officer outlined MGB plans to the double agent. He said that MGB Kiev was collecting detailed dossiers on the character and day to day activities of all important members of the Ukrainian emigration which obviously includes ZPUHVR. This information was to be utilized in widening the gap between the various emigree groups so that they could not present a united front. Specifically, a campaign was to be launched to strengthen the belief of the leaders of OUN/B and ZPUHVR separately that they were the rightful and sought for leaders of the Ukrainian Independence Movement. Soviet agents were to contact members of ZPUHVR and convince them of the justice of their cause and "talk down" the OUN/B to them as an unstable and fanatic group. Other Soviet agents were to contact OUN/B and try to "sell" them the idea that the Ukraine looks to them as the most heroic leaders in the struggle for independence. Still other agents were to be assigned to systematically compromise the outstanding leaders of both factions in order to provide material for the penetration agents in each organization to "talk down" the other group.

Whether or not the report is reliable has not been ascertained but the plan is sound and logical. If it is a genuine Soviet plan its effectiveness can be judged by the fact that a complete break between OUN/B and ZPUHVR was effected in the fall of 1948. Furthermore, if this break was to some extent the result of Soviet action, it is an excellent indication of the degree of penetration Soviet agents have achieved and their efficiency.

In December 1946, General Paul SHANDRUK, who at the time was deeply engrossed in Ukrainian politics in Germany, stated that he believed at least five percent of the Ukrainians in DP camps were Soviet agents or informers.

On December 6, 1946, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish "Shadow Government" in London wrote a letter to his representative in France stating that his observer of Ukrainian affairs in Germany, PAPROCKI, reported that there were a large number of Soviet agents among the Ukrainians there. These agents were particularly among the Trilogy (OUN/B and ZPUHVR in this case).

Another report of dubious reliability submitted in March 1947, states that Julius REVAY @ MIRTSZAK, formerly Minister-president of the "independent" Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic (formed officially in March 1939, and lasting for several months) was a Soviet agent. The report states that when the Soviet Armies occupied Prague, Czechoslovakia in 1945, he was arrested by them and "turned". He came to the US Zone of Germany and is reported to hold an important position in the UNR, as a minister in the "Ukrainian Exile Government".

REVAY was recruited as an agent for Major PETROV's political section of the RIS Baza III/C/M in Prague, Czechoslovakia. (There is no record of this unit in this headquarters). He was assigned to the US Zone of Germany with the following mission:

1. To penetrate the Ukrainian DP centers in Germany and establish himself in an influential position.
2. To organize the Carpatho-Ukrainians and become their spokesman and political representative, especially in America.
3. To organize or help organize a Ukrainian Socialist Party, which would gain recognition and provide him with publicity and increase his personal prestige and influence.
4. To observe and if possible direct Ukrainian diplomatic relations with the western allies along lines directed by the Soviet Union.
5. Facilitate the dispatch of Soviet agents to the United States.
6. Eventually emigrate to the United States himself.

It is interesting to note that point two and three of his assignment are aimed at the creation of more emigree organizations which would divide the Ukrainians even more and prevent them from consolidating their activities.

REVAY was reported to have been in contact with the Czech liaison officers, Lt. JANOVSEK, Ivan PIRICH and Ivan HORVATH, in Frankfurt, Germany, in 1947.

In April 1947, REVAY was arrested by the US authorities for war crimes on the request of the Czech government who desired his extradition. The possibility that the Soviets used the Czech government to effect the return of their agent must be considered. (This incident received considerable publicity because REVAY's brother who is a US citizen was reportedly able to start a Senate investigation). If the report concerning REVAY's recruitment by Soviet intelligence is true the request for his extradition would indicate that he may no longer be working with them or the move might have been engineered to cover his Soviet connections and build up his reputation as an anti-Soviet among the emigres. The report also is indicative of the foresight and determined policy of Soviet intelligence agencies in their methods of operation with Ukrainian groups. If the report is true, soviet intelligence policy was formulated in the early part of WW II and it may be assumed that they took full advantage of the unsettled situation immediately after the war to plant their high level agents within the major DP organizations. The confused situation made it easy to get agents into Germany and it is likely that many of them have to date gained important positions in the Ukrainian emigree organizations.

A report dated September 1948, states that the SB of OUN/B got a confession from Michael SHTIBEL @ MILAN, that he was recruited by the MGB in Uahorod in 1947, to penetrate Ukrainian Nationalist groups in Czechoslovakia. The fact that SHTIBEL was in the US Zone of Germany and had already applied for emigration to Canada would either indicate that he had given misinformation about where he was to work or that he was escaping from the Soviets.

A report dated 21 March 1947, states that the Soviets had penetration in the following Ukrainian organizations and publications in Berlin (it may be assumed that these organizations and publishing houses are connected with Ukrainian organizations in the U.S. and British Zones and furnish an excellent source and excuse for gathering information): The Ukrainian Information Directorate, The Union of Ukrainian Nationalists, Ukrainian Gromada, Ukrainian Educational Institute, National Organization of Ukrainian Students in Germany, Ukrainian Ecclesiastical Society, Ukrainian printing firm BOGDAN - KRABTSOV, and the Ukrainian publications: GOLOS, NOVAYA DOBA, UKRAYINETS, UKRAYINSKY VISTNIK, UKRAYINSKIYE DIYESTVITELNOSTY. The reliability of this report cannot be judged but the source is believed to be reliable. Penetration of these organizations would provide the Soviets with a great deal of information on Ukrainian personalities and politics as well as the important activities in leading members.

It should be noted that the National Organization of Ukrainian Students in Germany is probably identical with the Ukrainian Student Aid committee, which received its support from IRO and the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee, which is represented in Munich by Dr. Roman SMOOK, a US Citizen, who was the leader of OUN in the United States and believed to be in close contact with OUN/B at the present time. Daria REBET @ Daria OPLAND, one of the original members of ZPUHVR, teaches law at the Ukrainian University in Munich, which is affiliated with the Ukrainian Student Aid Committee. If Daria REBET confides in anyone in the Ukrainian University there is a possibility that the information would reach the Soviets.

In 1947 a fairly reliable informant stated that the majority of Soviet agents in the UNR. The informant stated that there is less internal discipline and no security service in the UNR, which makes it more vulnerable. It is possible that the UNR became a target for the Soviets, or that they used low level agents for penetration of UNR to detract attention from their operations against the ZPUHVR and OUN, or that they had accomplished their penetration of the latter two organizations and shifted their attention to the UNR. It must be conceded that the Soviets may have failed to get a high level penetration of ZPUHVR and attempted to accomplish this indirectly through UNR.

UNDO enters into the UNR and MUDRY is a leading figure in both organizations. He also maintains close contact with ZPUHVR. It is therefore not improbable that MUDRY might get information from ZPUHVR, which in turn would be obtained from him or his organizations through high level Soviet penetration.

In considering the possibility of a "leak of information" from ZPUHVR through UNDO or UNR, it must be kept in mind that ZPUHVR is to some degree dependent on the services of CPUE, Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigrants, (a welfare organization) from which it receives help for new arrivals coming from the Ukraine. The CPUE is very closely affiliated with the UNDO, and it is not inconceivable that an intelligence chain reporting new arrivals to UNDO and then to some members of UNR exists. Soviet penetration at any point in this chain would be effective in producing valuable information on the activities of ZPUHVR.

Members of ZPUHVR held important positions in OUN/B until 1948, and consequently any Soviet penetration of that organization would yield information about ZPUHVR. Penetration of OUN/B was accomplished very easily by a Polish communist agent in June 1949. The CIC reports on Dobrovolsk indicate that he had no trouble developing a contact with the OUN/B courier and accompanying him on trips to and from Paris. Further more the Polish agent was able to copy confidential documents in the possession of the OUN/B courier because of his extreme gullibility and complete lack of security consciousness.

Even if members of ZPUHVR are no longer connected with OUN/B it is not unlikely that many of their former friends maintain contact with them, purely for social reasons or to gather information for use by OUN/B and possibly any Soviet penetration agents in their organization.

There is a distinct possibility that Rostislav SHULGIN, in Switzerland continues to get information from VRECHIONA, who in turn is in constant contact with ZPUHVR headquarters in Munich, and passes this information to some foreign intelligence agency. If SHULGIN's earlier reports are an indication of how well VRECHIONA is kept informed, then ZPUHVR operations must be considered relatively insecure.

As an indication of another possible breach of security, ZPUHVR in Munich sent a letter to Mikola LEBED in the United States informing him of the OUN/B courier arrival in the U.S. Zone together with many details of the operation almost as soon as they were brought in on the case. The letter may have passed through the postal channels of several countries before reaching LEBED, and might have been censored. Furthermore, LEBED may have communicated this information to Ukrainian leaders in the U.S. He could not be too familiar with leaders and security of the Ukrainian organizations in the United States by virtue of his recent arrival. It is possible that he may have discussed the incident with some American Ukrainian leaders whose organizations may be penetrated by the Soviets.

This portion of the report was included to provide an indication of the well planned intelligence tactics of the Soviets in dealing with Ukrainian anti-Soviet groups, their degree of penetration of some of them, and particularly to emphasize the fact that most of them are extremely vulnerable and because of their close inter relation, both on an organizational and personal level, the penetration of one group presents a definite threat to the security of the others. Although ZPUHVR may be extremely security conscious, particularly in intelligence matters, their dependence on other organizations in minor matters, and the broad social and political relationships of their leaders with the leaders of the other Ukrainian organizations serves as a constant threat to their security. Annex C provides a biographical sketch of outstanding Ukrainians submitted by a reliable Ukrainian source. Careful analysis of these reports will indicate relationship of various groups with ZPUHVR leaders. If the security of the ZPUHVR is broken at any point their usefulness in intelligence operations is nil.

Although the security picture of ZPUHVR does not appear good, it is far better than that of any other Ukrainian organization. If cooperation with them is to continue it will be necessary to investigate the ZPUHVR completely to determine all of its capabilities and limitations and check

every possible point where security violations may arise. When this information has been obtained, ZPUHVR must be instructed and guided in improving the security of their organization. Although it may be difficult to secure detailed information concerning their organization, it is felt that, if they are sincere in their desire to cooperate with the US and reasonable, they can be made to understand that it will be to their advantage to furnish the information and accept guidance in the conduct of their security and intelligence operations.

ANNEX A
(Breakdown of the UHVR)

The following is a detailed description of organization, functions, and responsibilities of the various components of the Ukrainian Underground Government:

- I. The UHVR (a general statement covering all component branches).
 1. Consolidates the efforts of the independent sovial-political elements.
 2. Coordinates the duties of the politically active milieu.
 3. Formulates and directs Ukrainian State Policy.
 4. Is the representative of the Ukrainian people before a few foreign nations.
 5. A member of the UHVR must be a nationally active Ukrainian who accepts the directives of the "Great Congress" and carries them out.
 6. The UHVR consists of 25 members. The number of members can be enlarged through coopting. A coopting motion can be undertaken by the (1) "Great Congress" of the UHVR or (2) by the Presidium of the UHVR on recommendation of the Secretary-General.
 7. A member of the UHVR can be expelled only by a two thirds vote of the "Great Congress" of the UHVR, or between sessions of the "Congress" by the Presidium. Action by the Presidium takes the form of temporary suspension until the next session of the "Congress", at which time the case is decided.
 8. UHVR works through the following organs:
 - A) The "Great Congress" (Assembly or Convention) of the UHVR.
 - B) The Presidium and President of UHVR.
 - C) The General-Secretariat and its chairman.
 - D) The General Court and Chief Justice.
 - E) The Controller-General and his board.
 9. The UHVR also operates in the form of conferences of the UHVR presided over by the President.
 10. The duties and responsibilities of the special organs of the UHVR are controlled by internal regulations which are established by the president in conjunction with the Consul-General.
 11. Special commissions, boards, and bureaus of any organ of the UHVR may be called if the occassion arises.
 12. The UHVR will remain on Ukrainian territory. Only special delegates may be sent abroad.

II. Great Congress of the UHVR:

1. The highest Ukrainian legislative body during the time of the revolutionary struggle for an independent, sovereign Ukrainian nation is the "Great Congress of the UHVR.
2. The "Great Congress of the UHVR:
 - A) Establishes the basic law
 - B) Discusses and decides the most important political questions, determines the basic political line, establishes the program and tactics for the struggle for independence of the Ukrainian people
 - C) Receives reports on the activities of the various organs of the UHVR
 - D) Determines the course of action for all organs of the UHVR
 - E) Elects: (a) the president, (b) seven members of the Presidium, (c) Chairman of the General-Secretariate, (d) the Consul-General (Chief Justice), and (3) the Controller-General
 - F) Administers the oath to the president
 - G) Chooses new members to the UHVR and confirms members appointed by the Presidium
 - H) Expels members
3. The "Great Congress" will be called into session at least once a year by the President.
4. A special session of the "Great Congress" will be called by the President:
 - A) On his own initiative
 - B) On recommendation of the Presidium
 - C) On recommendation of the Secretary-General
 - D) On recommendation of the Controller-General
 - E) On request of one member of the UHVR
5. The President opens a session of the "Great Congress". It is then presided over by an elected representative who calls upon other members to complete the "Congress presidium" (probably special committees).
6. A majority of over fifty percent of the members of the "Great Congress" is necessary to pass a law.
7. All questions will be passed upon by a simple majority except to expel a member or to nullify a law which will require a $\frac{2}{3}$ majority. The UHVR may be dismissed only by a majority of $\frac{3}{4}$ of the active members.
8. In exceptional cases the UHVR can decide important questions on the basis of a vote, without calling the "Great Congress" into session.

III. PRESIDENT and PRESIDUM of the UHVR

1. The President is the head of the government and official representative.

2. The responsibilities and powers of the President of the UHVR
 - A) Calls and opens a session of the "Great Congress" of the UHVR
 - B) Directs the Presidium and conferences of the UHVR
 - C) Administers the oath of the Secretary-General, who is appointed by the representatives of the General-Secretariat
 - D) Administers the oath of the two members of the General Court, who are appointed by the Chief Justice
 - E) Administers the oath to the two members of the Control Board who are appointed by the Controller-General
 - F) Administers the oath to the Foreign Representatives of the UHVR (ZPUHVR) who are recommended for foreign assignments by the Secretary-General and appointed by the Chairman of the General-Secretariat
 - G) On recommendation of the Chairman of the General-Secretariat, the President relieves the Secretary-General of his duties
 - H) Administers the oath to the members of the Presidium, the Chairman of General-Secretariat, members of the General Court and the Control Board
 - I) Has the power of pardon
3. The President takes his oath from the Chairman of the "Great Congress" of the UHVR.
4. The Presidium, with the President as Chairman, is in full charge of the UHVR activities between sessions of the "Great Congress".
5. The Presidium consists of (a) the President, (b) three vice presidents and (c) four members.
6. The Presidium of the UHVR advises on the political line, tactics and practical means of operation of all of the units of the UHVR and gives them its opinion and suggestions.
7. The responsibilities of the Presidium of the UHVR:
 - A) Suggests calling a session of the "Great Congress"
 - B) Chooses new members to the UHVR on recommendation of the General-Secretariat
 - C) Suspends members of the UHVR who violate the bylaws
 - D) Receives statements and reports from the Chairman of the General-Secretariat, all of the Secretaries, the General Court and the Control Board
8. Frequency and type of report required from the various organizations of the UHVR will be determined through special consultation with each of them individually.
9. A quorum of the Presidium is necessary to transact business and will consist of one half of the members with the exception of the President.
10. In case the Presidium cannot operate, their duties fall to the President until the next session of the "Great Congress" of the UHVR, and during this time the Chairman of the General-Secretariat may not resign.

11. The Presidium takes action by putting a question to a vote. In case the votes are balanced the vote of the presiding chairman is decisive. If there is a political or constitutional conflict between the Chairman of the General Secretariat and the Presidium, the Presidium may demand his resignation after securing a 3/4 majority with at least 2/3 of the members present.
12. In the absence of the President his post will be filled by members of the Presidium in an order of succession determined by the "Great Congress".
13. In case of retirement or death or any other reason which calls for the prolonged absence of the President, his duties pass to the Presidium Board which is formed automatically of the leading members of the Presidium.
14. The Presidium Board is only provisional and is obliged to call a session of the "Great Congress" as soon as possible.
15. The President and Presidium are responsible for their actions to the "Great Congress" of the UHVR.

IV. GENERAL-SECRETARIAT of the UHVR

1. The executive organ of the UHVR is the General-Secretariat.
2. The General-Secretariat is composed of:
 - A) The Chairman of the General-Secretariat
 - B) Secretary for Internal Affairs
 - C) Secretary for Foreign Affairs
 - D) Secretary of War and Commander of Military Forces
 - E) Secretary of Finance and Industry
 - F) Other Secretaries
3. The Chairman of the General Secretariat assembles the "Great Congress" of the UHVR.
4. The Secretary-General is chosen by the Chairman of the General-Secretariat and the appointment is confirmed by the President.
5. The functions and responsibilities of the Secretary-General can be enlarged.
6. The Secretary-General formulates reports to the Presidium from the field of his responsibilities.
7. The Secretary-General is responsible to the "Great Congress" of the UHVR.
8. The Secretaries are responsible to the Chairman of the General-Secretariat and to the President.
9. On recommendation of the Chairman of the General-Secretariat, the President may relieve the Secretary-General of his duties.
10. The General-Secretariat decides all issues by vote. If the votes are balanced, the vote of the Chairman of the General-Secretariat is decisive.
11. The Chairman of the General-Secretariat can confer his duties on the Secretary-General temporarily.

12. In case of retirement or death of the Chairman of the General-Secretariat; the President, Presidium, Chief Justice, Controller-General and Secretary-General elect a new chairman.
13. The legality of all legislation is dependent on the signature of the President and Secretary-General.

V. GENERAL COURT

1. The General Court composed of a Chief Justice and two members is the juridical organ of the UHVR.
2. The Chief Justice (General Judge) is elected by the "Great Congress" of the UHVR and he appoints two members. His choice must be approved by the President.
3. The General Court is responsible to the "Great Congress" of the UHVR.
4. In case of retirement, death or any other reason which necessitates the prolonged absence of the Chief Justice, the President, Presidium, Controller-General, Chairman of the General Secretariate and members of the General Court elect a new Chief Justice.
5. The Chief Justice is assured judicial freedom in interpretation of constitutional questions and through his reports may advise the President on matters of law.

VI. CONTROL BOARD

1. The Control Board is composed of a Controller-General and two members.
2. The Controller-General is elected by the "Great Congress" and he appoints two members to the Control Board. His choice must be approved by the President.
3. The Control Board audits and regulates the financial and industrial statements of all of the organs of the UHVR and particularly the financial affairs of the General-Secretariat.
4. In case of retirement, death or any other reason which necessitates the prolonged absence of the Controller-General; the President, Presidium, Chief Justice, Chairman of the General-Secretariat, and members of the Control Board elect a new Controller-General.

ANNEX B
(UHVR Members)

The following list includes all of the known members of the UHVR and the offices they hold:

President: Yaroslav OSMAK (in Ukraine)

Vice-President: Ivan HRINIOCH (member of Presidium) (presently in Munich, Germany)
Vasyl MUDRY (presently in Germany)

Secretary of Internal Affairs: Rostislav VOLOSHIN @ PAVLENKO (died in 1945)

Chairman of the General-Secretariat: Roman SZUCHEWICZ (SHULHEVICH)
@ Taras TCHUPRINKA (in Ukraine)

Secretary of War: Roman SZUCHEWICZ (SHUKHEVICH) @ Taras TCHUPRINKA (in Ukraine)

Secretary of Foreign Affairs: Mikola LEBED (presently in U.S.)

Other members (position unknown): Volodimir PROKOP @ Vladimir LUHOVY
(in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presently in U.S.)
Vasil OKREMOVICH (Presently in Germany)
Dr. fnu TURJULA (presently in Germany)
Prof. Leo SHANKOVSKY (presently in Germany)
Mrs. Daria REBET @ Daria ORLAND
(presently in Munich, Germany)
Prof. fnu BILENKY (presently in the Ukraine)
Mikola DUZY (DUZI) (in MGB prison in Kiev since 1945)
KOLEDINSK (Ukraine)

ANNEX C

(Biographical Data on Ukrainian Political Leaders)

The following biographical sketches of the leading personalities in Ukrainian political life in Germany and particularly of ZPUHVR members, was compiled in 1947, by a Ukrainian source intimately acquainted with most of them. Most of the information is fairly objective and coincides with information available in this office but some allowance must be made for the source's partiality and prejudices evidenced particularly in the biographies of LEVISKY and MUDRY. The biographies of these men are in themselves a limited history of the Ukrainian independence movement.

Stephan BANDERA
Chief of OUN/B

He was born in 1907 and comes from a Galician peasant family. When he finished his secondary studies he consecrated his life to politics and joined the organization of Col. Eugene KONOVALETS, the UVO, which later (1928) became the OUN. Bandera remained in the homeland and became the active leader of the organization there. Between 1930 and 1931, the Polish government began a brutal pacification among the Ukrainian terrorists who were responsible for the murder and outrages against Polish officials and political leaders. Tracked by the Polish police, Bandera escaped to Germany in 1934 and went into hiding. In the meantime (1934) the Polish Minister of the Interior, PIERACKI, was assassinated in the streets of Warsaw. Poland had just concluded a pact of non-aggression and friendship with the Third Reich and now demanded the extradition of BANDERA and LEBED as leaders of the OUN, and instigators of the plot. They were returned to Poland, tried in Warsaw and condemned to death, but Pres. LEVITSKY and Vasyl MUDRY both appealed to the president of Poland and he commuted their sentence to fifteen years imprisonment. During the war in Poland in 1939, Bandera succeeded in making his escape and returned to the homeland. During the ensuing occupation of Galicia by the Soviets he resumed command of OUN in Poland. The youth of OUN proclaimed him a national hero, and a hero of the party. It was this fact which made it possible for him to take charge of the opposition which had been created in the OUN against MELNIK and his Directorate in the Spring of 1941. BANDERA successfully split the OUN.

Since that time, he has been the nominal chief of the OUN/B but has played a small role in the organization. He was arrested by the Germans in September 1941, and held in a concentration camp until October 1944. While he was held by the Germans his popularity did not diminish and all of the anti-German and anti-Soviet revolutionary factions operated under the name of Banderists, and it was OUN/B which later created UPA and UHVR. It has even been said that one could meet bands in the extreme north of Russia who had absolutely no connection, nor anything in common with the Ukraine, who went under the designation of Banderists, as a symbol of revolution and liberty.

The Germans were anxious to capitalize on BANDERA's popularity and therefore released him in October 1944. The Germans decided to change their political policy towards the Ukraine and upon the instigation of MELNIK offered the leaders of the four chief political factions an opportunity to form a Ukrainian National Committee (or Council) which the Germans would recognize as the de jure government of the Ukraine. The four leaders consulted were: BANDERA, MELNIK, LEVITSKY, and SKOROPADSKY. BANDERA refused to enter into his German plot, and because of his authority over the Trilogy, his refusal to join caused the plan to fall through.

Today BANDERA lives in retirement in Bavaria (after having lived in the vicinity of Insbruck). He does not take a direct part in the decisions of OUN/B but his friends still continue to monopolize on the popularity of his name.

Bishop Ivan BUCZKO

A Ukrainian Greek-Catholic priest residing in Rome. Since the abolishment of the Uniate Church in Galicia, he is the principle Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Prelate. He is very intelligent, very energetic and very brilliant. He is considered a great authority in the Vatican is honored by the friendship of Cardinal Tisserand, head of the Oriental Institute. Buczko is director of the Ruthenian College of St. Josaphat where he trains patriotic Ukrainian priests. He was in America from 1939-1941. He understands the great importance of the Trilogy and consistently furnishes support to its diplomatic service (ZPUHVR and couriers to the Vatican. He directs a Ukrainian Relief Committee in Rome and during the course of a conference on Ukrainian relief, over which he presided in Rome in September 1946, he made all Ukrainian aid destined for Italy, Austria and the Mediteranean countries dependent on Rome. He is very ambitious and has an extraordinary flair for politics. Buczko stays out of active politics but supports those Ukrainian groups which appear to have the best chances - consequently the Trilogy.

Bogdan OKOLOT

A member of OUN/Bandera, a coopted member of the ZPUHVR and their resident in Stockholm. He is still a very young man, originally from Przemysl who is studying medicine. He became active in the Ukrainian liberation movement in 1941. He was arrested for this reason by the Gestapo and sent to a concentration camp in Germany where he remained until liberated by the British in 1945. He was in such poor health upon his release that he went to Sweden to convalesce.

Zenon PELENSKI

A Galician journalist of great talent, who formerly worked in Mudry's newspaper, the Dilo. He is about 50 years old and lives in Munich. He is the habitual spokesman of the Trilogy. He is the editor of the principal Ukrainian newspaper authorized by the Americans in Munich, Ukrainska Hromada. The Trilogy uses him for conducting negotiations with other Ukrainian groups and with the Poles. He does not belong to any political party, which gives him access to all political factions. He is brilliant and intelligent but very **unstable**. Vasyl MUDRY, with whom he collaborated, is somewhat sceptical of him.

Eugene STACHIV @ Pavliuk KRAUS

The most active and best liaison agent of the Trilogy. The younger brother of Vladimir, he is about 30 years old. His life is a veritable epoch of heroic adventures of evasion of Polish, German and Soviet prisons. He organized OUN/B in Belgium.

Arsene SCHUMOWSKI

A remarkable Ukrainian personality, originally from Volhynia, where his father was an archdeacon of the Orthodox church. He is about 60 years old and is extraordinary among European engineers because he specialized in railroad construction materials. Before the war he was director of a Polish locomotive factory near Krakow. Without formally becoming a member of the ZPUHVR, nor of any other formation of the Trilogy, he enjoys their confidence and friendship and gives them sage and moderate advice. He also enjoys the confidence of the other Ukrainian political groups, and just as Vasyl MUDRY, plays the part of an arbitrator. He just became a member of the Committee for the Defense of the Tradition of the UNR, which was formed by the opposition to LEVITSKY within the cadre of UNR. He lives in Munich and occupies himself with social and welfare activities among the Ukrainian DP's.

Jaroslav STECKO (STETSKO) @ KARBOVSKI

Prime Minister of the Ukrainian government on the 30 June 1941
Member of the Directorate of OUN/B
Secretary-General of ABN

He is about 45 years old, cultured and from an intellectual Galician family. He was an important member of the Carpathian and Western section of OUN before the war.

A friend of Bandera, he got his position in the directorate of OUN/B during the split of OUN. At some risk he took over the presidency of the Council of Ministers in LVOV on 30 June 1941, and that same day proclaimed Ukrainian Independence. He continued to play the role of chief of government clandestinely for three months. He revealed excellent qualities as an organizer and improviser. He was arrested by the Gestapo in October 1941, and remained in a concentration camp until the end of 1944. He was liberated at the same time as Bandera and took part in the conversations with the Germans on the one hand and MELNIK, LEVITSKY and SKOROPADSKY on the other. Together with Bandera he contributed to the German failure to create an Ukrainian Central Committee in 1944. In April 1945, he was seriously wounded in a bombing of Germany. He was sick for a very long time and did not take an active part in politics.

The Trilogy charged him with the organization of the ABN and he is now the Secretary General. He has proved very energetic and active in this delicate assignment.

Paul SCHUMOVSKI

He is the younger brother of Arsene, is about 45 years old, and was professor of Zoology at the University of Warsaw. He is a member of the ZPUHVR and serves as their resident in Paris. He is not a member of the OUN/B but is just as fanatic as the members of that organization. He is misguided in his politics and for that reason ZPUHVR sent Vladimir PROKOP to repair the damage SCHUMOVSKI had done in Paris. (PROKOP is now in the United States and it is believed that SCHUMOVSKI is presently in full charge in Paris).

Mathew STACHIV

He is the uncle of Eugene and Vladimir. An old leader of the Ukrainian Radical Party of Galicia and representative to the Polish parliament in 1928, he edited propaganda leaflets before the war and throughout played a shadow role in Ukrainian politics. During the war, while his nephews were fighting against the Germans, he worked for Dr. SAUCKEL in recruiting Ukrainians as laborers for Germany. After the collapse of Germany he sought to pass himself off as a democrat. He opposes the Trilogy while being supported by Pres. LEVITSKY. He is the leader of the Ukrainian Radical Party in emigration and lives in the US Zone of Germany.

Vladimir STACHIV

Member of the Provod (Directorate) of OUN/Bandera until 1948. He is a member of the ZPUHVR and is secretary-general of the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners of German Concentration Camps. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs for STECKO.

A journalist by profession, young (less than 40 years old) and active, he one of the Propaganda chiefs of the Trilogy. Arrested by the Germans in the Ukraine in October 1941, he was held in various concentration camps by the Gestapo for three years. Of great moral fortitude and more cultured than the rest, he is bound to play an important role because he is both intelligent and modest.

Vladimir PROKOP @ Vladimir LUNOVOY

Member of the ZPUHVR

Member of the Directorate of OUN/B up to 1948

Born in 1914 in Galicia, he comes from a good Ukrainian, bourgeois, intellectual, ecclesiastical family.

An active member of OUN before the war, he was particularly noted by Col. KONOVALETS for his intellectual aptitudes and was sent abroad to study. During the internal conflict within OUN he sided with Bandera. Arrested by the Germans, he remained in a concentration camp until the collapse of Germany. He was a very close collaborator of HRIMIOCH and often took his place. He was a member of the Directorate of OUN/Bandera and is a coopted member of ZPUHVR. He is the permanent Ambassador-Extraordinary of this group. He is considered an important authority in OUN/Bandera and because of his influence with HRIMIOCH and LEBED, most of the decisions of the Directorate were submitted to him for approval.

While he was in Paris in 1946, he directed all of the politics of the Trilogy in western Europe. He was responsible for initiating the joint ZPUHVR - UNR note to the Conference of Ambassadors in September 1946, together with SHULGIN and SHANDRUK (which was repudiated by LEVITSKY).

Intelligent, studied, cultured, mysterious, fanatic and active are the qualities which can be attributed to him. He has all of the qualities requisite to play the role of the "power behind the throne", and furthermore he is extremely well liked by HRIMIOCH.

Wasył (Vasyl) MUDRY

Vice President of the UNVR
Vice President of the ZRUHVR
President of the CPUE (Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigrees) (1947)
President of the UNDO (Ukrainian National Democratic Party)
Former Vice Marshal of the Polish Parliament
Former leader of the Ukrainian faction in the Polish Parliament

Born around 1890 in Lvov, he comes from a large family of Liberal bourgeois Ukrainians. He is a journalist by profession. Since 1932, he was director of the largest Ukrainian daily newspaper in Galicia, the DILLO (founded around 1860), which follows a liberal-democratic policy. He was a member of the UNDO since 1910, and has always spoken in behalf of this organization.

During the war of 1914-1918, he was an officer in the Austrian Army and in 1918 became an officer in the Ukrainian Army in Galicia and participated in the battle for Lvov with the Polish troops commanded by General Haller in 1919.

It was not until he became the director of the "Dilo" in 1932, that he really entered Ukrainian politics in a big way. He was elected president of the UNDO and entered Parliament in 1935, as chief of the Ukrainian faction. He negotiated with the Polish government, concerning its decision (BECK's declaration at Geneva) that minority problems will not be submitted to the League of Nations but will be taken up directly with the minority, an agreement (normalization) that greatly extended the rights of the Ukrainian minority in the midst of the Polish State. Upon acceptance of the agreement (which was concluded through the intercession of LEVITSKY) Vasyl MUDRY was elected Vice Marshal of the Polish Parliament. The mode of existence between the Ukrainian minority and Polish majority was often disturbed by the Government in Warsaw, and this provoked the violent and brilliant intervention of V. MUDRY within the Parliament. Because of his attitude she became the chief of the opposition in the Polish parliament. He was greatly respected by the democratic western world, and represented the Ukrainians at all the International Unions and Congresses.

In conflict with the Polish Government from 1938 to 1939 because of the refusal of the Poles to consider a statute granting autonomy to Galicia within the framework of the Polish State (which was provided for in the "Normalization" agreement), because of the persecution of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches and because of the hostile attitude of the Poles toward the existence of the Carpath-Ukrainian State (formed Mar. 15, 1939) which Ukrainian public opinion favored, Vasyl MUDRY

changed his attitude toward the Poles and returned to LVOV just as the Soviet-German Pact was announced. On the 27th August 1939, just after the announcement of the pact, MUDRY called together all of the notables of the UNDO and of the Ukrainian Radical Party (the other Ukrainian political party which had representation in the Polish Parliament) and they unanimously adopted a motion to give their unconditional support and that of all Ukrainians to Poland in case of war. This motion did not take the form of a demand but was submitted as an offer. The Polish Government in recognition of this gesture on the part of the Ukrainian minority proposed a new agreement which would permit Ukrainians to enter into the government, enter the diplomatic service, increase their representation in the Parliament and finally to study a project which would afford the Ukrainians personal autonomy. This agreement was lost forever in the disorder that followed the collapse of Poland, but a great number of Ukrainians kept their promise and met a heroic death fighting for Poland in September 1939. Sometime later in 1943 when the Soviet-Polish conflict over Poland's eastern frontiers began, the London government had reason to regret their action with the Ukrainians because it would have given them a trump card to use against Russia. The Russians attacked the Poles on the grounds that they had mistreated the Ukrainian minority. The presence of Ukrainians in the London government would have entirely disproven this accusation.

During the war MUDRY went "undercover" in order to escape Soviet justice, hiding himself among the Germans with whom he did not want to have contact at any price. A man without a party and very realistic, he resigned himself to inactivity - but when the war in the east began to develop and OUN/B began to lead a revolutionary movement he could see nothing wrong with such action and without entering into the organization gave it his complete support. In 1943 he accepted a mission to go to Budapest to negotiate a non-aggression pact between the UPA and the Hungarians (November 1943).

In 1944 he took part in the foundation of the UHVR (June) and became a vice president. He received the mission of going to Germany after the collapse of the Third Regime and occupying himself there with the problem of Ukrainian Displaced Persons.

In 1945, after the end of the war, he became the leader of all relief activity, leaving active politics to the remaining members of the UHVR, while he became president of all the Ukrainian relief groups in Germany, which included as a counseling service, and the Central Representation of Ukrainian Emigres, where he plays the role of arbitrator to see that there is an equitable distribution of supplies among the various political, social, religious and geographic factions.

He reconstituted his party the UNDO in order to possess a tactical instrument in order to be able to counteract the influence of OUN/Bandera which was becoming too pronounced in the midst of the foreign representation of UHVR and in order to establish a contact with the leftist opposition groups. He recognizes the merits of the Trilogy but does not spare his criticism when they are at fault and always maintains the position of arbitrator.

A man from a liberal bourgeois family, he fears the revolutionary temperament of his friends, and although he sees eye to eye with them, is somewhat reserved. He places much stress on the fact that his Vice Presidency of the UHVR be kept completely secret because he is afraid of the Soviets.

An ambitious, intelligent man of the world, MUDRY enjoys the unanimous esteem of his compatriots and can play a very large part in reconciling and consolidating all of the Ukrainian groups.

Eugene WRECIIONA. (VRECHIONA) © Joseph BARAN

Member of the ZPUHVR (resident in Switzerland)
Member of the Directorate of OUN/B until 1948
Member of the General Staff of UPA

He was born in 1905 in Galicia and comes from a family of petty intellectuals. He is a chemical engineer having studied at the Universities of Prague and Munich.

He entered into the cadre of the OUN before the war, during a time when a great number of them were arrested and held in Polish jails.

He was delegated to the Carpatho-Ukraine when this tiny country proclaimed her autonomy within the Czechoslovakian Federation, just after the Munich pact (October 1938). WRECIIONA formed and instructed the Sitch, and the Ukrainian Militia in the Carpatho-Ukraine and after they had armed themselves the little Republic proclaimed its independence (on the 15 March 1939), just after Hitler took over Prague. At this time WRECIIONA was in command of the Sitch and contrary to orders received from MELNIK and the Directorate of OUN, he and his comrades decided to fight against the invading Hungarians. This was the first instance of violent discord within the OUN, which at the time was carrying out an opportunistic policy in Berlin. WRECIIONA was captured by the Hungarians and sentenced to death but the beginning of the war caused such a commotion that he was able to escape from the concentration camp and make his way to Vienna.

He established contact with BANDERA in Krakow in the Spring of 1941 and became a member of the Directorate, in charge of Military Affairs of OUN/B. He preceded the Germans into LVOV and prepared the proclamation of Ukrainian Independence of 30 June 1941. He then took command of the militia. He escaped arrest by the Gestapo just in the nick of time and hid in LVOV under an assumed name. He played an important part in the creation of the SB (Security Service) of the OUN and during this time used the cover of director of a cinema.

In 1943, he was delegated together with Vasyl MUDRY, by the committee which was planning the organization of the UHVR (the UHVR was non-existent at the time) to negotiate a non-aggression pact with the Hungarian General Staff, concerning Hungarian front line troops who were in Ukrainian Partisan territory. The negotiations were successful and the pact was concluded in Budapest. General SZAMBOTHY together with WRECIIONA and MUDRY pressed for a change of policy by the Hungarians so that they would take the same stand as the UPA and turn upon both the Germans and the Soviets as oppressors. These novel negotiations were interrupted by the "Coup d' Etat" of SZALASSY.

Paralleling the negotiations of WRECIOMA in behalf of the OUN, the UHVR negotiated with the Polish resistance (A.K.). These negotiations were concluded with the signing of a protocol in February 1944, by both LEBED and WRECIOMA.

In the autumn of 1944, WRECIOMA was ordered to go to Italy to help organize a resistance movement there. He was very disappointed by this experience and the traitorous actions of the Italians.

In the spring of 1945, WRECIOMA was charged by the trilogy to take up the negotiations with the Poles again and to try to get to London (seat of the exile government) but this was prevented by the Polish crisis. In 1946, WRECIOMA signed an agreement for technical cooperation with the Anders Army (Joseph CZAPSKI) in Switzerland.

WRECIOMA is a very active, intelligent, cultured person whose advice is heeded by the Trilogy. His sage advice often moderates their excesses.

Mikola LEBED

Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the UHVR
Secretary-General of the ZPUHVR
Member of the Directorate of the OUN/B until 1948

Born in 1907 in Galcia to a family of petty bourgeois intellectuals. He completed his studies as a doctor of philosophy. Since 1939 his life has paralleled that of Stephan Bandera, with whom he was condemned to death (later commuted to 15 years imprisonment) for the murder of the Polish Minister, PIEKACKI, in 1935. He took advantage of the defeat of Poland to escape from Prison in 1939 and participated in the struggle of the Ukrainians against the Soviets. When the split occurred in OUN he sided with Bandera, his prison companion, and became a member of the Directorate of OUN/B. On the 30 June 1941, he participated in the creation of the independent Ukrainian State in Lvov. He entered into the fight against the Germans as organizer of UPA. Although condemned to death by the Gestapo, he was never captured. However, he was forced to abandon his mother, wife and young daughter, who were deported by the Germans to the Ravensbruck Concentration Camp, where they remained for two years. He participated in the foundation of the UHVR, then abandoned his military activities in order to concentrate on Foreign affairs. He became Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the UHVR and Secretary-General of the ZPUHVR.

A man of extraordinary courage, he circulates constantly among the Ukrainians and their various emigration centers. He totally lacks diplomatic experience which is evidenced by the fact that he is too abrupt and fanatic. However his intelligence and culture make up for his lack of experience. A man of principals and cold logic he cannot be swayed in either. He is very energetic with a hard and unyielding character, and could be considered a classic revolutionary type. Nor does he lack sentimentalism or cynicism to make his character complete.

He was in Rome and Germany but is presently in the United States. All of the foreign affairs of the Trilogy are his responsibility. He and Dr. HRINIOCH play the most important part in the ZPUHVR. Despite his authority and character he never makes an important decision without consulting with his colleagues and competent collaborators and always considers their opinion.

(Rev. Dr.) Ivan HRINIOCH

Vice President of the UHVR
President of the ZPUHVR
Member of the Directorate of OUN/B up to 1948

He is Ukrainian Greek Catholic priest (whom his adversaries accuse of being defrocked) about 45 years old. He is a doctor of Theology and a former student of the Jesuits. Prior to the war he was a close collaborator of the most important figure in the Ukraine during this century, Monsignor Count Andrey SZEPTICKI (SHEPTITSKY), Metropolitan of the Uniate Church and Archbishop of LVOV. It was because of this that he was able to make frequent trips to Rome and at the same time maintained liaison between Col. E. KONOVALETZ and the OUN in Poland. Even his intimate friends are not able to find out anything concerning his life.

He played the role of "power behind the throne" and councilor when the conflict arose between the OUN troops and the Directorate. He entered into the Directorate of OUN/B and was the principal political advisor but never exposed his position publically. He was a member of the UPA and was a founder-member of UHVR, where he was elected to the post of Vice president (June 1944).

In the summer of 1944, the UHVR engaged in numerous diplomatic negotiations with the Poles, with the Hungarian opposition, and with MICHAYLOVITCH, and the most delicate and difficult of these negotiations were always entrusted to HRINIOCH.

When he arrived in Krakow he used the name ORLOW (ORLOV). The UPA received a concrete proposition from CANARIS to suspend their operations, and it was HRINIOCH who negotiated with him. During the negotiations he rejected the German proposition. A few days after the proposition was actually made the CANARIS organization was dissolved (after the 20 July 1944 attempt) and at about the same time the German Army was being chased out of the Ukraine. In October 1944, HRINIOCH took up a contact with the German SD and the representatives of the other peoples of the East who were working for the Germans (KEDIA's group and KHAYUM KHAN's group). He hoped to convince the Germans who were still within the borders of the Ukraine to retreat and leave their arms and munitions to the UPA, and he tried to get the OKW to permit the Ukrainians, the Caucasians and the Belorussians to form units within the Wehrmacht in order to rally the ranks of the UPA. Despite his competency and diplomacy, his plan clashed with the German megalomania, and he was not able to accomplish his mission successfully.

Today HRINIOCH and LEBED direct the Trilogy in emigration, and have the best contact with the homeland.

HRINIOCH is very intelligent, decided and cunning. He is the most cultured member of the Trilogy but very fanatic and extremely suspicious. It is said that he is the ROBESPIERRE of the Trilogy. In the intimate reunions of the Trilogy his brilliant exposees, which are noted for their perfect logic but marked with a certain cruelty and cynicism, are always brought up. With strangers he is charming, but says only what he wishes to. He is an audacious organizer who exercises great authority among his friends and over his subordinates. He is very severe and the Ukrainian enemies of the Trilogy are very afraid of him since he is capable of great cruelty. It is believed that he is extremely intelligent and that his reputation for cruelty comes entirely from his fanaticism.

Andrey LEVITSKY

President ad interim and Director and Ataman of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Ukrainian Republic (UNR)

Born in the eastern Ukraine near Poltava around 1877, Andrey LEVITSKY, studied law and became a Ukrainian revolutionary. He became a lawyer and enjoyed a great popularity in his province. He was arrested several times by the Tsarist police and sent to prison.

When the Russian revolution broke out in 1917, he came to Kiev and participated, as a member of the first Central Council, in the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. He did not play a major part in this action. It was not until 1919 that he became a Minister and a year later President of the Council of Ministers, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this capacity he negotiated the treaty of Alliance with Poland in Warsaw with Marshal PILSUDSKI. The treaty was signed in Warsaw in April 1920. In the course of his travels to Warsaw he acquired the friendship of the Poles.

After the defeat of the Ukrainian Armies in 1921 (after Polish defection) the President of the Directory, Simon PETLURA, the government of the UNR presided over by LEVITSKY, and the army passed into exile. It was a somber but confused period. In Poland, PILSUDSKI lost power and his successors did not concern themselves with their former allies.

Marshal PILSUDSKI effected his Coup d'Etat on 12 May 1926, and offered restitution to the Ukrainian group of UNR and the support of the Poles. At the same moment (25 May 1926), Simon PETLURA was assassinated in Paris. According to the Ukrainian constitution of 1920, the President of the Council of Ministers automatically became President and LEVITSKY became chief of UNR. President LEVITSKY remained permanently in Warsaw under the protection of the Polish police. The situation of the President and his government in exile was particularly difficult, on the one hand, they had to utilize the support offered by the Poles (which manifested itself in the diplomatic arena, in the instruction of Ukrainian officers, and by the execution of the financial clause of the Warsaw agreement) and on the other hand, by the necessity to defend themselves against unpopularity among the Ukrainians, unpopularity which came from this very support. Galicia and Volhynia were under control of Poland and sustained their disagreement to the Police Regime, and they accused the government in exile, UNR, of accepting the loss of Volhynia and Galicia to Poland and of accepting Polish support. There were violent conflicts and the UNR from 1926 to 1939, acted as an arbitrator between the Polish government and the Ukrainians in these provinces.

President LEVITSKY also wanted to play the role of arbitrator between Poland the third Reich during the tragic summer of 1939. The elements of this affair are very interesting but rather long to recount. After the pact between Germany and the USSR in August 1939, President LEVITSKY refused a Polish offer for transportation to Paris for himself and his collaborators since he assumed that the war would be a short one and he could somehow resume his role of arbitrator after the Germans arrived.

The calculations of Pres. LEVITSKY were completely false. The directors of the Third Reich forced him to keep quiet at first but latter permitted him to oppose the pro-allied politics of his former collaborators, Pres. V. PROKOPOWICZ and Alexander SHULGIN (Dec. 1939 to Jan 1940). The split in the midst of the UNR (the presidency of PROKOPOWICZ) diminished the authority of LEVITSKY among his following. He kept a nice distance from the Germans and from the German collaborators, MELNIK, Prof. KUBIYOVICH and Hetman SKOROPADSKI (the latter was closely allied with the Prussian General Staff in keeping with his tradition).

During the period of the war and occupation of the Ukraine, President LEVITSKY shrewdly kept himself from being sent to prison by negotiating with the CANARIS opposition, thereby getting his title recognized but actually assuming no responsibilities.

In October 1944, the Reich brusquely changed its polich toward the Ukraine (where they no longer had any German soldiers) and conceived the idea of forming a Ukrainian Central Committee or Council which would serve as the government for an "independent" Ukraine and consequently, LEVITSKY was invited to Berlin. The promoter of this project was Col. MELNIK, who wanted to create an organization which would be composed of the leaders of the four main Ukrainian political groupings. Colonel MELNIK (OUN/Melnik followed by the group of KUBIYOVICH, favorably disposed toward the Germans), Hetman SKOROPADSKI (pretender to the Ukrainian throne), Andrey LEVITSKY (President of UNR), and Stephan BANDERA (leader of OUN/Bandera and the Trilogy). MELNIK and BANDERA were released from prison. The project failed because of the consistent refusal of BANDERA to come to an understanding with the Germans because of the atrocities they committed in the Ukraine.

After the collapse of Germany, President LEVITSKY was eager to justify and commend the anti-German activities of Alexander SHULGIN in 1939-1940, and played his trump card by stating that it was ordered by the UNR. He engaged in negotiations with the Trilogy but they resulted in complete failure.

Fanatically jealous of his title of President, tired by all these events, Andrey LEVITSKY retired to a DP Camp in Mainz-Kastel where he has been separated from his most outstanding collaborators and now engages in petty emigration politics (1947). The reconciliation between the London Poles (Mission of Major PAPROCKI) and LEVITSKY completed in 1946 would lead one to believe that he remained in Poland in 1939 (an action considered as treason by General SIKORSKI, 1939-1943) with the consent of the prewar Polish government (RIDZ-SMIGLY, BECK and SLAWOJ-SKLADKOWSKI).

President LEVITSKY is very intelligent, decided and extremely cunning. He never enters into significant political formations but is a master of the art of intrigue and thereby is able to "pull strings". He is very sensitive to the flattery of his entourage, and now in his old age has only two passions, bridge and alcohol.